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Empirical work strongly suggests that bank loans are different from corporate bonds in domestic as well as international capital markets. Authors have emphasized the renegotiation, screening and monitoring advantage of banks to explain this difference. In this paper, I provide evidence that banks also gain a valuable advantage associated with the complex contract design and the time at which payments are collected. Indeed, unlike private placement and bonds, the remuneration of bank lending is typically composed of a battery of fees and commissions along with the interest rate. Mills and Terrell (1984) , Booth and Chua (1995) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) document that these fees, especially the up-front fee, drive substantial amounts. The up-front fee is a compensation that is paid out at the signature of the contract to lenders. Unlike other fees, it does not compensate for other services but lending (other fees include commitment, arranging, and agency fees).
I believe up-front payments contain an element of compensation for risks and renegotiation. Gorton and Kahn (2000) suggest that, unlike bondholders, bankers price the loan so that they minimize subsequent costs associated with moral hazard and renegotiation. As a consequence, initial loan pricing may involve transfers from the borrower to the bank in the form of up-front fees.
Also, Thakor and Udell (1987) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) find evidence of the non-linear pricing on commitment facilities being associated with the presence of informational asymmetries regarding the creditworthiness of the borrower, up-front fees acting as a screening device. This is consistent with my findings.
However there are additional potential economic motivations for the non-linear compensations of bank credits. Conventional practice asserts that fees paid on the unused balance are aimed at reimbursing sunk administrative and commitment costs (Mills and Terrell, 1984) ). Instead, empirical findings (see James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1990; Chemmamur and Fulghieri, 1994 ) support the ability of financial intermediaries to collect private information on the borrower (see Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992) . Provided interest premiums are typically the 2 publicized pricing component, this suggests that the non-linear pricing is aimed at voluntarily biasing the publicized interest premium so that interest rates would not reveal the private information. I do not find evidence suggesting that front-end payments are aimed at concealing information.
I investigate the design of bank loans contracted by sovereign states because the absence of enforceability means and collateral in these markets allows for the disentangling between renegotiation and default risks. Indeed, in a reputation-lending framework, private creditors deny future access to capital markets to sovereign defaulters (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Cole, Dow and English, 1995; Grossman and Han, 1999) . The indebted government thus strategically considers either to negotiate new terms on existing bank debts or to default on both the bond and bank debts. There are no partial defaults nor assets liquidation. Therefore, I can easily isolate the renegotiation risks associated with temporarily shortage of cash (i.e. liquidity risks) from the default risks associated with insolvency (i.e. the debts exceed what the borrower will ever be able to repay).
Interestingly, studies on international debt markets show that, unlike bond yield margins, the interest margins on sovereign bank debts are insignificantly sensitive to indicators of liquidity default (Edwards, 1986; Boehmer and Megginson, 1990; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000) . Arguably, authors claim that the small number of lenders and their cohesive behavior that features bank debts in contrast to dispersed bond holders, allow for cost free debt settlements (Folkerts-Landau, 1985; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) . As a consequence, bonds margins include both the liquidity and the solvency risks while bank loans charge for default only. I do not question the renegotiation ability of banks. Instead, I claim this constitutes a valuable asset for the borrower that is in reality compensated front-end in the way described by Gorton and Kahn (2000) . This is consistent with my results. 3 The findings are based on a relatively extensive and reasonably heterogeneous sample of bank loans contracted or guaranteed by LDC sovereigns in the fifteen-year period from January 1983 to December 1997. I find that the up-front fees pay for the expected costs associated with renegotiation and information asymmetries. By contrast, both the hypotheses of a fixed cost and concealed information relative to public debt markets are rejected.
The paper is related to the literature on the design of bank loans, focusing on the non-linear structure of pricing. The results highlight the advantage that bankers extract from the complex contract design compared with other capital markets participants.
The paper is also related to the literature on the role of financial intermediaries in capital markets, particularly in sovereign debts markets. The results highlight the renegotiation service that banks provide. The compensations are channeled through a more complex timing of compensations collection.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I provide some background in sovereign lending and bank credits and list the implications that would motivate the non-linear pricing of bank loans. After that, I present in section 2 the model of sovereign debt with and without exogenous pricing split-up and the empirical models. Section 3 describes the sampling procedure, the actuarial methodology, and the constructed database. The results are reported in section 4. I find strong support for fees being related to renegotiation costs (short-term risks) and information asymmetries. I report the robustness tests in section 5. In the final section I summarize the results and provide some concluding remarks.
Sovereign debt and bank loans -the theories and their implications

Contracting costs
The widespread argument among bankers is that the payment effected up-front is intended to guarantee the refund of administrative sunk costs. Mills and Terrell (1984) mentioned this point. I also frequently heard this argument during my interviews with syndicated loan managers. However, 4 such a justification of the custom has its limitations, especially in sovereign capital markets. First, there are no reasons to believe that the agent of the syndicate is unable to distribute fixed incomes to the providers according to the various interest margins (instead of a payment made up-front).
Second, provided there exists no collateral, the amount paid up-front is reducing the probability of repayment of the same amount. The implicit higher interest margin (the so-called all-in margin) simply applies to the lower loan volume. Nevertheless, the refund of fixed-lending costs constitutes my first hypothesis.
Collusion between the debtor and the banker to bias interest margins
Previous authors have provided strong evidence of the ability of banks to collect inside information (e.g. Fama, 1985; Rajan, 1992) and empirical work confirmed this ability (e.g. James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989) . Hence, other capital markets participants are likely to pay larger attention at bank loans pricing. Moreover, reports of bank loans in specialized banking reviews show that interest margins spreads receive more publicity than any other remuneration.
The interest premium may thus become a benchmark, the publicized loan rate being a creditworthiness proxy freely available. To the extent of my knowledge, I know no study that has investigated the impact of bank margins on bond yield premiums. Although this would be a very interesting topic, it is not yet my concern here. I will merely assume that this is a likely feature of capital markets. Provided this impact exists, the borrower and the lender may be tempted to bias the margin by creating side less significant payments such as up-front fees. By positively affecting the borrower's grading, the latter pay lower premiums on her public debts. Not only would this have a positive impact on the borrower's wealth, but also this creates a wealth transfer to bankers' assets value. Therefore, both the borrower and the lender have immediate interest in colluding and scatter the overall payment into various fees. 5
Compensations for expected renegotiation
The macroeconomic studies of the pricing of sovereign debts have produced questionable results. Folkerts-Landau (1985) argues that, by promo ting the ease of renegotiating new terms on the loan contract, the reduced number of lending banks relative to bondholders promote the facility to renegotiate the terms on the liability contract. As what the author sees is a proof, the descriptive comparison between yield premiums on bond debts and interest spreads on bank loans shed light on larger bond yield premiums. Edwards (1986) extends the analysis and shows that public debtholders charge significantly for liquidity risks, while bankers do not. Similar results are described in e.g. Boehmer and Megginson (1990) , Min (1998) , Eichengreen and Mody (2000) .
However, the more complex workouts also make bond debts implicitly senior to private debt.
This feature takes higher importance in the sovereign debt markets where, because of the lack of enforceability means and collateral, the seniority that is mentioned on contracts is eventually meaningless. Moreover, settlement is unlikely to be cost free so that I suspect that renegotiation prospects actually make the banking liability more sensitive to liquidity risks than bonds, which actually benefit from the liquidity insurance provided by bankers. Therefore, it is not clear whether the bank facility should bear lower costs than bonds and why liquidity risks have no impact on its price. I believe the absence of liquidity risks compensations in the sovereign bank debts interest margins is related to the sharper clear-cut between the cash shortage and the insolvency risks.
Indeed, more recent studies in domestic markets find that the smaller is the number of banks that fund new credit facilities, the larger is the impact on the value of the firm (Preece and Mulineaux, 1996) . Banks are likely to provide renegotiation services. Also, Gorton and Kahn (2000) who view the banker as a renegotiation services provider, show that initial terms of the debt are not set to price default but rather are designed to balance bargaining power in later renegotiation. As a consequence, initial loan pricing may involve transfers either from the borrower to the bank in the form of front-end payments or from the bank to the borrower in the form of 6 under-priced services. Although the author's conclusions rely on the seniority of bank loans that is inexistent in sovereign capital markets, the banks can still threaten their debtor of a lending termination. This is actually in line with macroeconomic studies of sovereign loan pricing.
Screening device
Other explanations of the non-linear structure of bank loan pricing have relied on screening in asymmetric information environments (Thakor and Udell, 1987; Shockley and Thakor, 1997) with an application to loan commitments.
1 Indeed, the authors provide empirical evidence suggesting that fees paid on used balance are meant to screen in the presence of informational asymmetries.
The takedown decision is contingent on the quality of the borrower's project. The intuition is that the lower quality investor will favor (usage) fees paid on takedown amounts since her probability of making use of the loan is lower. This indicates the borrower's investment quality. The empirical evidence reported by Shockley and Thakor (1997) is consistent with the self-selection pattern.
I believe the results can be extended to term loans contracted by sovereign states. Indeed, at every repayment date, the sovereign borrower can decide either to repay or default without any seizure threat on her assets. Opting for repayment guarantees the loan renewal while defaulting would instead restrict access to foreign capital. The borrower hence holds a put option on repayment flows until the maturity date, debt principal and interest installments constituting the payment for future capital. Given this feature, the l ower quality borrower will favor higher interest margins because she can renegotiate or default them later on. Providing higher front-end payments would therefore signal the commitment to repaying in the future, given that the overall cost remains equal. Also, it signals the current liquidity availability and projects quality. Hence, the fourth possible motivation for front-end payments is related to agency problems and the asymmetric information the lender faces. Alongside the spread, bankers would use the up-front payments as a screening device in asymmetric information environment on a similar way as described by Shockley and Thakor (1997) . 7 2. Empirical approach.
Sovereign loan pricing
In this section I suggest an extension of the sovereign risk-sharing model proposed by Feder and Just (1977) , and subsequently extended by e.g. Edwards (1986) , Boehmer and Megginson (1990) , Min (1998) . The model has been frequently used for sovereign debts pricing analyses and has become a standard model.
Assume the economy is a one-period economy composed of three agents, the sovereign and two bankers. Bankers are risk-neutral and compete on price. The sovereign agent seeks to borrow a certain amount q at date 0. At date 1, the borrower strategically defaults on principal and interest repayment with probability p. The unique alternative is the full repayment with probability 1-p. The creditor has no alternative but to accept the borrower decision. This follows the reput ation hypothesis and the consequent credit disruption presented in the previous section. 3 The loan is remunerated by the interest rate composed of the floating benchmark free-rate i, usually the London inter-bank euro-currency rate (LIBOR) and the spread over the benchmark. For simplicity purpose I assume the refinancing interest rate and the treasury free-rate are equal. Suppose r is the mark-up.
The expected value of the banker's present profit π is:
Risk-neutral bankers compete on price r so that expected profits break even. r is therefore determined by an increasing function of the probability of default:
Sovereign loan pricing with an exogenous split-up
Alternatively, consider a contract in which, for some exogenous reasons (e.g. a collusion between the banker and her client), the borrower pays a share ϕ of r in the form of a commission paid at date 0. The new contract is defined by (q, r, ϕ) where q is the loan size, r is the interest margin and ϕ is the share of r paid out at the signature of the contract. The so-called up-front fee is then ϕ.r. The outstand ing share is still paid at date 1 as post-disbursement payment (or spread) S equals (1-ϕ).r. The expected present profit is hence:
Risk-neutral bankers compete on the so-called all-in interest margin r so that expected profits break even. r is therefore determined as an increasing function of the probability of default p and share ϕ of the all-in interest margin r paid up-front:
Note that the equivalent loan contract (q', r, 0) with size q' equals q(1-ϕ r) and thus 0 up-front payments yields a higher all-in interest spread r':
(1) .
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Specifically, when ϕ equals zero we obtain the model described by Edwards (1986) . When i and ϕ equal zero, that is the contract modeled by Feder and Just (1977) . r and S are therefore two decreasing convex functions on ϕ and increasing concave functions on i. The more is paid up-front the smaller is the risk exposure. The remuneration is null when repayment is sure and goes to 9 infinite when the probability of default tends to one. The spread S as estimated in previous studies is thus substantially biased if there exists a share ϕ of the remuneration paid up-front.
Since the decision variable is binary, let us assume the probability of default p is logistic distributed as a function of a set of exogenous macroeconomic determinants X:
The obtained natural logarithm of compensations on contract (q,r,0), i.e. without any exogenous split-up, is:
The log-remuneration of contract (q,r,ϕ) i.e. with exogenous split-up, is:
As a result, the sign of the marginal impacts of exogenous factors on the all-in and the spread are identical. However, despite the identical sign, the share paid up-front has a different impact on 
The empirical model The linear model
The specified linear model explores the determinants of the pricing elements on sovereign bank loans. The pricing elements are the all-in margin, the interest spread, and the up-front fee. For specificity purpose, the up-front fee is estimated as an equivalent yearly payment on used balances.
The price term linear models are specified by: The dummies correct for the presence of specific terms on the contract and for the temporary adverse economic environment. Two dummy variables indicate the benchmark rate is respectively the US and J apanese primary rates. Time dummies correct for year 1995 that witnessed the Mexican crisis aftermath, and 1997-year end after the Thai currency had collapsed. The last dummy 11
indicates the presence of a tax-spare clause in the contract that states the interest payments on loan will not be subject to any withholding tax.
Liquidity is proxied by the amount of foreign currency reserves available to the sovereign relative to the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) short-term debt. This indicator is inspired by Eichengreen and Mody (2000) . The ratios of reserves relative to imports and the short-term debt relative to exports are two alternative variables. However, it turned out that the latter contains no additional information. The liquidity variable indicates the probability of a temporary foreigncurrency shortage. In the sovereign debt perspective, this indicates default and the subsequent credit disruption is not necessarily maximizing the country's wealth. Instead, the sovereign will seek to renegotiate the loan arrangements. The liquidity variable, hence, indicates the perspective of renegotiation rather than debt repudiation. Therefore, the sign of ψ 3 is expected to be negative on all pricing values. However, liquidity impact was found insignificant on previous studies on sovereign debt spreads.
The solvency indicator is constructed as the ratio of the total amount of PPG long-term debt (the lifetime being longer than a year) relative to GNP. Solvency indicates the extent to which the total amount of liabilities is likely to be larger than expected cash flows. Should it be the case, reputation-based sovereign debt theories show that strategic default (repudiation) is the sovereign debtor's optimal decision. In previous studies the sign of ψ 4 was significantly positive on the spread. I expect similar results. Not necessarily should the impact be significant on the up-front fee.
The second set of exogenous variables is constituted of the country's macroeconomic fundamentals indicators that follow the recent emp irical literature on sovereign and international risk, mainly Eichengreen and Mody (2000) , Min (1998) , Cantor and packer (1996) , and Bohemer and Megginson (1990) . The inflation is determined by the month-to-month yearly consumer prices growth in the issuing country. It indicates the monetary policy consistency. The sign of ψ 2 is expected to be positive on all pricing terms. Per capita income growth is calculated as the average 12 value of the GNP per capita yearly return over the last five years. The ratio of the gross domestic investment relative to the GNP indicates the long-run growth expectations as well as, to some extent, the government's commitment to development. The sign of ψ 5 is expected to be negative on all terms of pricing.
The two following variables are aimed at assessing the validity of the asymmetric information hypothesis to motivate non-linear pricing. The variability of growth is calculated as the variability of income per capita growth in the last five years. It captures the uncertainty on income. It also proxies for the amount of potential asymmetric information. ψ 6 is expected to be positive for both the interest spread and the fees. The impact on the spread indicates risk aversion while the impact on the fees will indicate the potential of agency costs. The ambiguous interpretation should be clarified with the use of an estimate of how well known the debtor is among creditors. This is proxied by the size of debtor's commercial debt relative to the overall LDC debt. The share of the private creditors' asset is similar to the variable defined as the book value of debt plus the market value of equity utilized by Shockley and Thakor (1997) . The impact on the spread should be insignificant while I expect a negative impact on fees.
Finally, the share of bond debts relative to the total private creditors debt (bank loans and bonds) isolates the incentive for collusion between the sovereign and the banker so that the interest spread is publicized with a bias. The ratio indicates the weight of public markets in the sovereign private creditors debt and, therefore, the higher is the share, the higher is the incentive to conceal information. This will be consistent with a negative impact on the spread together with a positive impact on the up-front fees and the share of up-front payments in the combined remuneration.
Possibly, this variable will create confusion with the cross-monitoring hypothesis tested by Booth (1992) . This is why the collusion hypothesis will be consistent if the ratio has an insignificant impact on the combined cost, as well.
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The extended linear model
The approach outlined above enables to identify the effect of the presence of asymmetric information and renegotiation risks on the spread and the up-front fee. In other words, this is the effect one expects should there be no trade-off between the spread and the fee, the size of the debt market testing for this. The extended model is derived from the marginal impact described by equation 
where X j,i,m is the vector of explanatory variables as described above. Share is the calculated share of the all-in yearly payment paid front-end. Margins are the interest spread and the all-in margin. I test whether the fee results from an exogenous split-up agreed by the banker and her customer. This is consistent with the share having a negative marginal impact on both the spread and the all-in cost as described in Equations (4) and (5). Moreover, if this was true, there may be a co-linearity with the size of the public debt relative to the commercial debt, but not with other variables.
The non-linear model
Finally in a third extended non-linear specification, I focus more precisely on the collusion hypothesis. Because I find that the inclusion of the share paid up-front has a dramatic statistical 
ln()ln(1)
. (1) amounts of information regarding the borrower, the disbursements/repayments schedules, and the fees. In particular, the IFR also indicates for some contracts the respective amounts on which fees are to be paid so that I could calculate the average value of up-front payments.
I selected all loans issued or guaranteed by states, governments, monetary central authorities, and public enterprises and agencies situated in countries ranked as low or middle income by the World Bank in 1998 or 1999. 5 Non-guaranteed debts issued by public enterprises and agencies were retained where the debtor could reasonably be assimilated to a quasi-sovereign entity. 6 Notice that the selection of sovereign borrowers permits the exclusion of commercial risk to focus on specific sovereign risks. This is very important although almost absent in the previous literature. In the extent of my knowledge, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) first make the distinction. The authors indeed find a significant higher spread charged on international bank loans to private borrowers relative to sovereigns.
The second requirement in the contracts selection is a minimum amount of information regarding the size of the loan, the duration, and the interest rate. The information recorded for each contract is the signature date of the contract, the identity, the type and geographic location of the borrower, the type and purpose of use of the loan, the currency of disbursement and repayment, the global, original and issued amounts in denominated currency and (current) US dollars. The disbursement and repayment schedule information includes the possible draw down and grace period, the number of tranches, the repayment frequency and period, bullet or balloon repayment. Interest payments are described by the f ixed interest rate or the floating benchmark rate and the spread. All types of fees are indicated with the related amounts.
However, provided that reports are often incomplete, a blank in place of fees remains ambiguous.
This may mean fees were absent in the contract or the report was incomplete.
Calculation of the all-in margin
Beyond the interest margin, the all-in cost margin is an essential element for the acceptance of the loan. The calculation methodology, however, varies slightly according to the actuarial officer. This is why, except for a few exceptions, I follow the standard method suggested in Rhodes (2001) 
Description of the sample
The sample includes 679 observations of loan contracts from banks to LDC sovereign borrowers for which information is available on pricing structure (spread, index, and fees), loan size, term-to-maturity, and borrowing sovereign. 58 countries are represented. The oldest contract 17 was signed in January 1983 and the most recent in December 1997. This is a large number relative to previous studies. Indeed, Mills and Terrell (1984) based their study on a sample of 183 syndicated Euro-credits in the three year 1981 -1983 . Booth and Chua (1995 focused on a sample of corporate debt issued between 1987 and 1989. Last, Shockley and Thakor (1997) analyze loan commitments and lines of credits purchased in 1989 and 1990 in the US.
Summary statistics of the terms of the contracts in the sample are displayed in Table [1] .
Frequencies and average values of costs of contracts are displayed by year and country in Table [2] and Table [ fee pay for 19% of total return of the public debtors Euro-credit loans. The figure is similar in my sample. Alternatively, Booth and Chua (1995) find that the average up-front fee on term loans amounts to 1.05%. This is 40% higher than the up-front payment on sovereign private debt. The authors also report 47% of their sample with up-front fee while my sample of sovereign loans report the presence of such a fee on 65% of the contracts. Finally, Shockley and Thakor (1997) find only a mean up-front fee of 26% on loan commitments to US publicly traded firms. Interestingly, the difference is function of the type of debtor and the likely amount of public information. I find similar results. Moreover, the high amounts of money driven by up-front fees along with their heterogeneity constitute a preliminary evidence of the little relevance of the contracting cost hypothesis and give credit to the creditworthiness and asymmetric information hypotheses. The next section presents the results of the estimates and their interpretation.
Empirical results
Estimation
All contracts are considered individually. This allows a direct analysis of the interaction between the terms designed on the contract. The fundamentals indicators are implemented as exogenous variables. Their number has been simplified relative to previous studies. This is intended to avoid any misspecification due to multi-colinearity. Therefore, every factor is proxied Liquidity. The insignificant impact of Liquidity is consistent with previous results presented by Edwards (1986) and subsequent studies of the spread on sovereign debt in LDCs. On the other hand, long-term indicators, Solvency and dIncome, are as expected significant at the level 0.01, with high t-statistics respectively of 4.03 and -4.14. However, the presence of a large public debt market drives both the spread and the combined all-in margin down at the significance level 0.01.
Funding costs and price disclosure
This contradicts the collusion hypothesis. Interestingly, this is consistent with the cross-monitoring hypothesis presented in Booth (1991) . The size of the debtor liabilities in the LDC debt market has a significant positive impact on the spread and the combined all-in yearly margin. This result is probably consistent with risk exposure issues instead of asymmetries of information. The participants in capital markets being already highly exposed (large ratio), they request a higher lending premium.
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The estimated all-in margin that combines up-front fees and interest spread in a yearly equivalent margin is significantly determined by all factors. Results, hence, contrast with the spread model estimates. Although being larger than its significance impact on the interest spread (0.954), 0.22 is a low significance of liquidity in statistics standards. Nevertheless, withdrawing Liquidity yields a substantial loss in the R-squared value. Therefore, the final model keeps this variable.
Generally speaking, short-term and volatility indicators have a higher impact on the all-in margin.
Long-run solvency have a lower impact. This provides preliminary evidence of the short-term factors being, indeed, remunerated through front-end payments. This contrasts with previous results. The interpretation of non-enforceability presented in Folkerst-Landau (1985) , Edwards (1986) , and Boehmer and Megginson (1990) are therefore likely to be inconsistent with the new data. Note the presence of a larger bond market also result significantly in a lower all-in remuneration at similar levels. This is inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis that predicts the size of the bond market should have an impact on the spread and fees separately, but not the combined payment. Instead, this is consistent with the cross-monitoring results presented by Booth (1992).
Therefore, findings provide evidence of the collusion hypothesis being unlikely to determine the presence of up-front fees. Besides, the managing costs will probably determine to some extent the charges paid out at the signature by the borrower but is probably accompanied by other factors.
Renegotiation and agency costs
In columns (d) and (e) of Table 4 , the share of the up-front payment is included in the model as an explanatory variable. This is intended to test the linear marginal impact as reported in equation by national investments and the size of the bond market, while inflation has a positive significant impact on the up-front fees calculated as a margin. The share of the total debt of the debtor in the total less-developed countries debt provides significant but contradictory results. It has a positive impact on the face value, whereas it is negative on the equivalent margin.
Therefore, there is strong evidence of up-front payments being determined by renegotiation costs while the repudiation risk is insignificant. This gives support to analyses like Gorton and Kahn (2000) . Moreover, the up-front fee is also associated with information availability (MktSize) and factors of asymmetric information (VdIncome). This is consistent with Shockley and Thakor (1997) .
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Robustne ss
Other terms in the contract
Regressions of the face value and equivalent fees on other terms of the loan contract are presented in Table [ 5] . The estimates replicate the model presented by Mills and Terrell (1984) and estimated with a sample of loans issued during the period 1981-1983. I too find a highly significant relationship between the fees in face value or equivalent margin form and the spread and the duration of the loan. The estimated average life is actually of a lower explicative performa nce.
These results are similar to the ones described by Mills and Terrell (1984) . The authors interpreted these results as evidence of fees functioning as a device for service compensation along with hiding information to public markets, namely the fixed-cost and the inside information hypotheses. In the light of the results reported in table [4] , the positive impact of the spread on the fees is likely to be due to colinearity. I showed there were outstanding differences despite the set of common macroecono mic factors. Error terms also respond poorly to normality tests, while the normality hypothesis of the error terms predicted by model ( i) in Table [ 4] are not rejected at standard significance levels.
Moreover I make a separate estimate of the determinants of the share of the yearly premium paid up-front. The OLS estimates of the share of the remuneration paid up-front is presented in the second part of Table [ 
Selectivity bias
My sample of syndicated loans is by no means comprehensive nor is it necessarily a random selection of the population. For instance, if the willingness of the issuers or arrangers to share data is to some extent related to the success of syndication or some other characteristics, estimates based on such data might be biased. To explore whether selectivity bias is a concern, I use a Heckman (1979) 
Estimate of the extended non-linear model
In this section the least-squared estimates of the non-linear model described by equation [8] are presented. I implement the non-linear ordinary least squared model with Stata®. Starting values are derived from Table [4] . Results are reported in Table [6] .
Respective coefficients associated with Inflation, Liquidity, Solvency, dIncome and V(dIncome) are found to be significant at the level 0.03, with t-statistics of 3.67, -2.56, 2.15, -2.29, and 3.44.
Respective signs are consistent with the hypotheses. The size of the debt market relative to the LDC debt market and the share of bonds in the country's debt financing are found to be irrelevant to 24 explain the spread. However, normality tests on the error terms perform poorly and therefore should be rejected. This adds further evidence of the up-front fees being unlikely to result from a collusion between borrowers and bankers to mislead capital markets actors.
Endogeneity of the interest spread payments
Interestingly, the spread paid on top of the basis interest rate may have some impact on the managing costs. For instance, the riskier borrower could yield higher administrative costs for the banker for executive meetings as well as information collection. The fees may too be a determinant of the spread if it acts as a price adjustment. To examine this possibility, I test for the endogeneity of the spread using the augmented regression procedure suggested by Hausman (1976) . The test is based on the null hypothesis that the impact of the error term regressing the log of spread on all exogenous factors in equation (6) has an insignificant impact on the log of up-font. Results show that the null hypothesis that the interest spread is exogenous cannot be rejected (p-value equals 0.858). Alternatively, OLS is a consistent estimator for the model.
A thorough comparison with public markets
To provide further evidence on the little explanatory power of the inside information hypothesis to explain the non-linear pricing, I do a contract-by-contract comparison of the pricing on pairs of bonds and loans which will present sufficient common characteristics. Indeed, previous literature has failed in determining which of a syndicated and a bond loan presents a higher spread. Both comparative studies presented by Folkerts-Landau (1985) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000) help very little since they are based on pooled data sets. They are designed to highlight the respective determinants of spreads on bank loans and primary bond issues instead of determining which of the two presents higher spreads. The sample of public debt primary issues is constituted of all eurocurrency primary issues of public loans launched by LDCs sovereigns during the period 1983-1997.
They are floating rate denominated so that the spread can be compared more easily. All bonds are issued between 1983 and 1997. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table [7] .
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I calculate the difference between the spread designed on syndicated loans and bonds at the primary issue date. Both types of loans display the same floating index and the lifetime is similar.
The descriptive figures are displayed in Table [8] . The figures are displayed in function of the number of days separating the two issues. Results show that spreads on bank loans are higher than spreads on floating-rate bonds in general. 12 The findings contrast with Eichengreen and Mody (2000) , which find primary issues bond spreads in their sample three times as large as syndicated loans spreads. Presumably, the difference is related to the little accuracy of the latter study resulting from the use of monthly-pooled data.
For further details, Table [ 9] reports relevant terms of paired banks and bond debts launched in a less than 60 days window. Pairs of floating-rate notes are constituted of 25 syndicated loans and 24 bonds. None of the eleven pairs of contracts designed with a similar currency and basis rate have lower spread on bank loans. The sample of fixed-rate notes is constituted of six bank loans and eight bond issues. For facility reasons, the pairs of fixed interest rate loans are not reported in the table. Aga in, fixed interest rates charged on bank loans are found at least as high as public debt interest rates. Interestingly, larger spreads are associated with more troubled periods. Therefore, the descriptive analysis provide further evidence of up-front fees being unlikely to be intended to downward bias publicized interest margins in the attempt to misprice bonds.
Summary and concluding remarks
The paper suggests an innovative contribution to the investigation of the complex non-linear pricing of bank liabilities. The analysis is conducted in the sovereign debt markets where proxies for liquidity and solvency risks are more easily separable. By focusing on the determinants of the up-front fees (the up-front fee is a charge paid out at the signature date), t he study addresses fundamental issues of the role of financial intermediaries, especially being a renegotiation insurer.
It also looks at the potentiality for non-linear pricing to be a screening device, thus providing the banker with a contracting advantage. The investigation is based on a uniquely extensive sample of 26 bank loans contracted or guaranteed by 58 less-developed countries sovereigns in the period between January 1983 and December 1997. The well-detailed reports allow for the calculation of the equivalent yearly margin on the utilization period for each individual loan.
The main findings suggest a strong impact of the renegotiation costs on front-end borrowing payments while they hardly affect the interest mark-up. Interestingly, this is consistent with previous studies on sovereign international loans that focused on the sole interest spread. This is also consistent with Gorton and Kahn (2000) who predict that front-end payments compensate for renegotiation and monitoring costs.
The second interesting result is that front-end payments are larger in an asymmetric information environment in similar manner as in Shockley and Thakor (1997) . Namely, the banker uses frontend payments to screen among borrowers of different creditworthiness. The lower quality borrower will favor higher interest margins because she can renegotiate or default them later on. Paying out larger compensations front-end would therefore signal the commitment to repaying in the future as well as the quality of the borrower's projects, provided the overall cost remains equal.
The inability to establish which of the screening and the liquidity insurance compensations is the main economic motivation for the non-linear pricing constitutes the main shortcoming of the paper. It should not however limit the contribution of my findings, namely that the ability of banks to create a complex non-linear pricing on their assets makes the latter special in capital markets.
Whether this demonstrates that banks are rather liquidity insurer or that this constitutes an efficient signaling device making banks different deserves further investigation. I believe that the two hypotheses are not competitive though, and therefore front-end payments are used in both means.
This should stimulate new avenues of research.
By contrast, the results strongly rejects that the non-linear pricing is meant to bias publicized interest rates. The results also reject the attempt of the bankers to obtain administrative costs repayment front-end. If ever, these should be related to future renegotiation administrative costs.
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The findings also relate to the role of banks in sovereign debts markets. As a matter of fact, by contrast to previous studies, I find that banks demand payment for all types of default as well as renegotiation risks in identical manner public debt holders do. The difference is that, unlike bondholders, bankers have the possibility to design complex non-linear compensations so that renegotiation costs are paid out in the first place and also that bankers are more able to screen out sovereign debtors, which commit to repaying. Hence, the higher complexity of the pricing design to some extent provides economic motivations for the presence of sovereign bank debts although they benefit from no seniority. The dependent variable in column (f)-(g) is the logarithm of the up-front fees in percentage as it appears on the contract. The dependent variable in columns (h)-(i) is the logarithm of the up-front fees expressed as an equivalent margin above the basis rate. The dependent variable in column (j)-(k) is the share of the up-front payment in the all-in cost that combines up-front fees and interest spread. Exogenous variables are: i is the government currency-andmaturity related monthly average bond yield; Inflation is the yearly month-to-month consumer prices increase;
Liquidity is the foreign currencies reserves to short-term debt ratio, p-test (rejection probability) in parentheses;
solvency is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt to GNP; dIncome is the last five years GNP-percapita returns average; V(dIncome) is the variability of income per capita return in the last five years; Investment is the national gross investment to GNP ratio; MktSize is the share of the country private creditors debt relative to all LDC debt; Bond is the share of private creditors debt in the form of bonds; Tax-Spare indicates the presence of a clause exempting from withholding tax. Table 6 . Least-squared estimate of the non-linear model with exogenous split-up of payments
The endogenous variable is ln( spread) the logarithm of the average spread over the benchmark. Reported exogenous variables are: Inflation is the yearly month-to-month consumer prices increase; Liquidity is the foreign currencies reserves to short-term debt ratio; solvency is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt to GNP; dIncome is the last five years GNP-per-capita returns average; V(dIncome) is the variability of income per capita return in the last five years; Investment is the national gross investment to GNP ratio; MktSize is the share of the country private creditors debt relative to all LDC debt; Bond is the share of private creditors debt in the form of bonds. 
